When we implement a portfolio selection methodology under a mean-risk formulation, it is essential to correctly model investors' risk aversion which may be time-dependent, or even state-dependent during the investment procedure. In this paper, we propose a behavior risk aversion model, which is a piecewise linear function of the current wealth level with a reference point at a preset investment target. Due to the time inconsistency of the resulting multi-period mean-variance model with an adaptive risk aversion, we investigate in this paper the time consistent behavior portfolio policy by solving a nested mean-variance game formulation. We derive semi-analytical time consistent behavior portfolio policy which takes a piecewise linear feedback form of the current wealth level with respect to the discounted investment target.
INTRODUCTION
According to the classical investment doctrine in Markowitz (1952) , an investor of a meanvariance type needs to strick a balance between maximizing the expected value of the terminal wealth, E[X 1 |X 0 ], and minimizing the investment risk measured by the variance of the terminal wealth, Var(X 1 |X 0 ), by solving the following mean-variance formulation,
where X 0 is the initial wealth level, X 1 is the terminal wealth at the end of the (first) time period and γ(X 0 ) ≥ 0 is the trade-off parameter between the two conflicting objectives. We call γ(X 0 ) risk aversion parameter, which represents the risk aversion attitude of the investor and could depend on the initial wealth level X 0 . The larger the value of γ(X 0 ), the less the risk aversion of the investor. Mathematically, (M V (γ(X 0 ))) is equivalent to the following formulation,
with risk aversion parameter ω(X 0 ) = 1 γ(X 0 ) . In a dynamic investment environment, the risk aversion attitude of a mean-variance investor may change from time to time, or could be even state-dependent (i.e., depend on the investor's current wealth level X t ). Björk et al. (2014) and Hu (2013) proposed, respectively, in continuoustime and multi-period settings, that the risk aversion parameter ω takes the following simple form of the current wealth level X t , ω(X t ) = ω X t , (ω ≥ 0).
Due to the positiveness of the wealth process X t in the continuous-time setting, ω(X t ) proposed by Björk et al. (2014) is always nonnegative, which implies that the risk aversion of the meanvariance investor is a decreasing function of the current wealth level. Applying the same model to a multi-period setting as proposed in Hu (2013) , however, could encounter some problem, as there is no guarantee for the positiveness of the wealth process in a discrete setting. When the wealth level is negative, ω(X t ) becomes negative, which implies an irrationality of the investor to maximize both the expected value and the variance of the terminal wealth, which results further in an infinite position on the riskiest asset (See Theorem 7 in Hu (2013) ).
In a continuous time setting, Hu et al. (2012) introduced a risk aversion parameter γ as a linear function of the current wealth level X t , γ(X t ) = µ 1 X t + µ 2 , (µ 1 ≥ 0).
When the wealth level is less than −µ 2 /µ 1 , γ(X t ) becomes negative, also leading to an irrationality of the investor, which contradicts the original interests of the investor of a mean-variance type.
In this paper, we propose a behavior risk aversion model as follows,
where W is the investment target set by the investor at time 0, ρ −1 t is the risk-free discount factor from the current time t to terminal time T , and γ + t ≥ 0 and γ − t ≥ 0 are constant risk aversion coefficients for the ranges of X t on the right and left sides of ρ −1 t W respectively. Basically, we consider a piecewise linear state-dependent risk aversion function in our behavior risk aversion model. This proposed behavior risk aversion model is pretty flexible in incorporating the behavior concern of a mean-variance investor. If the current wealth level is the same as the discounted investment target, the investor becomes fully risk averse and thus invests only in the risk-free asset. If the current wealth level is larger than the discounted investment target, the investor may consider the surplus over the discounted target level as house money and the larger the surplus the less the risk aversion. If the current wealth level is less than the discounted target level, the investor may intend to break-even and the larger the shortage under the discounted target, the stronger the desire to break-even (the less the risk aversion). The magnitude of γ + t (or γ − t ) represents the risk aversion reduction with respect to one unit increase of the surplus (or the shortage). Apparently, different mean-variance investors may have different choices of γ + t and γ − t . For example, an investor who is eager for breaking-even when facing shortage and feels less sensitive with levels of surplus, may set γ
At time 0, the investor faces the global mean-variance portfolio selection problem,
whose pre-committed optimal mean-variance policy is given by Li and Ng (2000) and Zhou and Li (2000) under multi-period setting and continuous time setting, respectively. However, at time t, the investor faces a mean-variance portfolio selection problem for a truncated time horizon from t to T ,
whose optimal mean-variance policy is different from the pre-committed optimal policy in general (See Basak and Chabakauri (2010) , Cui et al. (2012) , Wang and Forsyth (2011) ). This phenomenon is called time inconsistency. In the language of dynamic programming, the Bellman's principle of optimality is not applicable to this model formulation, as the global and local objectives are not consistent (See Artzner et al. (2007) , Cui et al. (2012) ). In the fields of dynamic risk measures and dynamic risk management, time consistency is considered to be a basic requirement (see Rosazza Gianin (2006), Boda and Filar (2006) , Artzner et al. (2007) and Jobert and Rogers (2008) ).
Strotz (1955) (1956) suggested two possible actions to overcome time inconsistency: (1) "He may try to pre commit his future activities either irrevocably or by contriving a penalty for his future self if he should misbehave", which is termed as the strategy of precommitment; and (2) "He may resign himself to the fact of inter temporal conflict and decide that his 'optimal' plan at any date is a will-o'-the-wisp which cannot be attained, and learn to select the present action which will be best in the light of future disobedience", which is termed the strategy of consistent planning. Strategy of consistent planning is also called time consistent policy in the literature. For dynamic mean-variance model, Basak and Chabakauri (2010) reformulated it as an interpersonal game model where the investor optimally chooses the policy at any time t, on the premise that he has already decided his time consistent policies in the future. More specifically, in a framework of time consistency, the investor faces the following nested portfolio selection problem,
with the terminal period problem given as
The time consistent policy is then the equilibrium solution of the above nested problem, which can be derived by backward induction. Björk et al. (2014) , Hu et al. (2012) and Hu (2013) extended the results in Basak and Chabakauri (2010) by considering different state-dependent risk aversions mentioned before in this section. In the original setting of dynamic mean-variance portfolio selection with a constant risk aversion, the time inconsistency is caused by the appearance of variance of the terminal wealth in the objective function, which does not satisfy the smoothing property. When we consider more realistic time-varying and wealth dependent risk aversion in this study, it further complicates the degree of time inconsistency, which forces us to consider time consistent policy in this paper. For a general class of continuous-time mean-field linear-quadratic control problems (see Yong (2013) ).
In this paper, we focus on studying time consistent behavior portfolio policy under the proposed behavior risk aversion model. The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows: In Section 2, we provide the basic market setting and formulate the nested meanvariance portfolio selection problem. We derive in Section 3 the semi-analytical time consistent behavior portfolio policy, which takes a piecewise linear feedback form of the surplus or the shortage with the discounted wealth target. In Section 4, we extend our main results to cone constrained markets. After we offer in Section 5 numerical analysis to show the trading patterns of investors with different risk aversion coefficients, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
MARKET SETTING AND PROBLEM FORMULATIONS
We consider an arbitrage-free capital market consisting of one risk-free asset and n risky assets within a time horizon T . Let s t (> 1) be a given deterministic return of the risk-free asset at period t and e t = [e 1 t , · · · , e n t ] ′ be the vector of random returns of the n risky assets at period t, which is defined on the probability space (Ω, F T , P ). We assume that e t , t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1, are statistically independent, absolutely integrable continuous random vectors, whose first and second moments, E[e t ] and E[e t e ′ t ] are known for every t and whose covariance matrixes Cov(e t ) = E[e t e ′ t ] − E[e t ]E[e ′ t ], t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1, are positive definite 1 . We further define the excess return vector of risky assets P t as
It is not difficult to verify that Cov(P t ) ≻ 0.
An investor invests an initial wealth X 0 in financial market at the beginning of period 0. He/she allocates X 0 among the risk-free asset and n risky assets at the beginning of period 0 and reallocates his/her wealth at the beginning of each of the following (T − 1) consecutive periods. Let X t be the wealth of the investor at the beginning of period t, and u i t , i = 1, 2, · · · , n, be the amount invested in the i-th risky asset at period t. Then, X t − n i=1 u i t is the amount invested in the risk-free asset at period t. Then, the wealth at the beginning of period t + 1 is given as
The information set at the beginning of period t is denoted as
Our main results can be readily extended to situations where random return vectors are correlated. This extension can be achieved based on the concept of the so-called opportunity-neutral measure introduced by Cerný and Kallsen (2009). and F 0 represents the trivial σ-algebra over Ω. We confine all admissible investment policies to be F t -measurable Markov control, whose realizations are in R n . Then, P t and u t are independent, the controlled wealth process {x t } is an adapted Markovian process and F t = σ(x t ).
We now formulate the portfolio decision problem of the investor at time t as follows,
where
is the risk-free discount factor with ρ −1 T = 1 and γ t (X t ) is given by
Similar to the approach in Basak and Chabakauri (2010) , we can further formulate the multiperiod mean-variance model into an interpersonal game model in which the investor optimally chooses the policy at any time t, on the premise that he has already decided his time consistent policy in the future. Then the time consistent behavior portfolio policy (or time consistent policy in short) is the optimizer of the following nested mean-variance problem (N M V ),
with terminal period problem given as
which can be solved by a backward induction. Since the stage-trade off γ t (X t ) reflects certain behavior pattern in terms of his wealth level, we call the optimal policy to (N M V ) time consistent behavior portfolio policy.
SEMI-ANALYTICAL TIME CONSISTENT POLICY
In this section, we focus on deriving the time consistent behavior portfolio policy. Before presenting our main results, we introduce several important functions and notations first. Proposition 3.1 Suppose that deterministic numbers a
Then we have
where K denotes the Euclidean norm of vector K.
Proof. See Appendix A.
According to Proposition 3.1, we denote the finite optimizers of F + t (K) and F − t (K) as follows,
and define the parameters a 
with the terminal condition a Horst and Thoai, 1999) . In such cases, we can use the existing global search methods for d.c. functions in the literature to derive optimal K + t and K − t .
With the above notations, we show now that the time consistent behavior portfolio policy is a piecewise linear feedback form of the surplus and the shortage of current wealth level in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 The time consistent behavior portfolio policy of (N M V t (γ t (X t ))) is given as follows for t = 0, . . ., T − 1,
in which the parameters a
Furthermore, the mean and variance of the terminal wealth achieved by the time consistent behavior portfolio policy are
Proof. See Appendix B.
Remark 3.2 Proposition 3.1 and Theorem 3.1 have revealed that the nested mean-variance problem (N M V t (γ t (X t ))) is a well-posed optimization problem in the sense of the existence of a finite subgame Nash equilibrium policy. 
EXTENSION TO CONE CONSTRAINED MARKETS
In real financial markets, realizations of (F t -measurable) admissible policy are often confined in a subset of R n , instead of the whole space R n . In this section, we consider the situation that the realizations of admissible policies are required to be in a cone. Such cone-type constraints have been widely adopted to model regulatory restrictions, for example, restrictions for noshort selling (See Cui et al. (2014) and Li et al. (2001) ) or non-tradeable assets. Cone-type constraints are also useful to represent portfolio restrictions, for example, the holding of the real estate stock must be no less than the bank stock. We express the feasible set of the realizations of admissible polices as A t = {u t ∈ R n |Au t ≥ 0, A ∈ R m×n } (see Cuoco (1997) and Napp (2003) for more examples). Then, mean-variance investors would face the following constrained nested mean-variance problem,
with the problem in the last stage given as
Theorem 4.1 The time consistent behavior portfolio policy of (CN M V t (γ t (X t ))) is given as
where the optimal investment funds K 
with −A t = {−u t |u t ∈ A t } is the negative cone of A t , and the parameters a Proof. See Appendix C.
In cone constrained markets, the time consistent behavior portfolio policy remains a piecewise linear feedback form of the current wealth level and the discounted investment target. The only difference from unconstrained markets is that we need to search the optimal investment funds in an A t related cone instead of the entire space.
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, we study a numerical example to analyze the property of the time consistent behavior portfolio policy proposed in this paper. Consider a pension fund consisting of S&P 500 (SP), the index of Emerging Market (EM), Small Stock (MS) of U.S market and a bank account with annual rate of return equal to 5% (s t = 1.05). Based on the data provided in Elton et al. (2007) , we list the expected values, standard deviations and correlation coefficients of the annual rates of return of these three indices in Table 1 . We assume that the annual rates of return of the three risky indices follow a joint lognormal distribution. An investor with initial wealth X 0 = 1 is facing an investment opportunity of three years (T = 3), with the following behavior risk aversion γ t (X t ), Table 2 . We can find some interesting features from Table 2 . First, for given γ + , the larger the value of γ − , the larger the absolute values of K − t , a − t and b − t . Second, whenever the discounted investment target is less than the current wealth level (i.e., ρ −1 t W < X t ), the investor chooses to invest a portfolio, which includes almost a fixed proportion K + t with respect to the surplus of current wealth level. Third, when the discounted investment target is larger than the current wealth level (i.e., ρ −1 t W > X t ), the investor with larger risk aversion coefficient γ − invests a Table  3 ). Additionally, for given γ − , the larger the value of γ + , the less the absolute values of K − t , a − t and b − t . In fact, the same pattern holds for γ + = 1. But the differences are too small to identify in Table 2 . Next, we analyze the global investment performance of the time consistent behavior portfolio policy proposed in this paper. We assume that all investors choose a very natural investment target W = 2, which is twice of the value of X 0 and gives rise to ρ −1 0 W ≥ X 0 , i.e., the discounted investment target is no less than the initial wealth level. Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show the relationship of Sharpe ratio with respect to γ − (with γ + = 1) and γ + (with γ − = 1), respectively. Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show the probability density functions (PDFs) under different settings with different risk aversion coefficients. We can see that different investors may achieve different global investment performances under their different time consistent behavior portfolio policies. However, for the situations of γ − = 1, all the investors' time consistent policies are quite similar (see column K − t in Table 3 ), which result in similar Sharpe ratios and PDFs of the terminal wealth level. In other words, in our setting, the negative risk aversion coefficient γ − has a higher impact on the model. At last, we analyze our data in a cone constrained market. We present our brief results under a no short selling constraint in Table 4 . Due to the presence of the no shorting constraint, the position on risky indices is forced to zero whenever the discounted investment target is larger than the current wealth level, i.e., K − t = 0. 
CONCLUSIONS
When we implement a portfolio selection methodology under a mean-risk formulation, it is crucial to assess the investor's subjective trade-off between maximizing the expected terminal wealth and minimizing the investment risk, which in turn requires good understanding of the investor's risk aversion which is in general an adaptive process of the wealth level. We propose in this paper a behavior risk aversion model to describe the risk attitude of a mean-variance investor, which takes the piecewise linear form of the surplus and the shortage with respect to some preset investment target. Our new risk aversion model is flexible enough to incorporate the features of "house money" and "breaking-even", thus enriching the modeling power to capture the essence of the investor's risk attitude.
As the resulting dynamic mean-variance model with adaptive risk aversion is time inconsistent, we focus on its time consistent policy by solving a nested mean-variance game formulation. Fortunately, we obtain the semi-analytical time consistent behavior portfolio policy and reveal its piecewise linear form of the surplus and the shortage with respect to the discounted wealth target. Our numerical analysis sheds light on some prominent features of the time consistent behavior portfolio policy established in our theoretical derivations. 
APPENDIX
Appendix A: The Proof of Proposition 3.1
where M is the largest eigenvalue of Cov(P t ).
If y t 1 {yt≥0} is zero, (i.e., y t ≤ 0 almost surely), we can construct an arbitrage portfolio by shorting L and holding L ′ 1 risk-free asset. Similarly, if y t 1 {yt<0} is zero, (i.e., y t ≥ 0 almost surely), we also can construct an arbitrage portfolio by holding L and shorting L ′ 1 risk-free asset. Thus, we conclude that y t 1 {yt≥0} and y t 1 {yt<0} are nontrivial random variables with finiteness of the second moment.
Moreover, P t is absolutely integrable, so do y t , y t 1 {yt≥ −s t ξ } and y t 1 {yt<
Then, for given L, we have
Furthermore, we havẽ
where O(ξ) is the infinity of the same order as ξ and the second equality holds due to the fact of E t y t 1 {yt≥
Based on the discussion for all possible L, we make our conclusion for F + t (K). Similarly we can prove the result of
Appendix B: The Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. At time t (t = 0, 1, · · · , T ), the investor faces the following optimization problem,
where the conditional expectations
We now prove by induction that the following two expressions,
hold along the time consistent policy, {u T C t , u T C t+1 , · · · , u T C T −1 }, at time t. At time T , we have (16) and (17), respectively, hold at time t + 1 along the time consistent policy {u T C t+1 , · · · , u T C T −1 }. We will prove that these two expressions still hold at time t and the corresponding time consistent policy is given by (9).
As the wealth dynamic of period t is
It follows from the policy {u t , u T C t+1 , · · · , u T C T −1 } that we have
t W , we denote any admissible policy as u t = K(X t − ρ −1 t W ) with K ∈ R n . Then the cost functional can be expressed as
Applying Proposition 3.1 yields the optimal time consistent policy at time t, u T C t = arg min ut∈R n J t (X t ; u t ) = K + t (X t − ρ −1 t W ).
Then, substituting the above optimal time consistent policy back into (18) Furthermore,
t W , we denote any admissible policy as u t = K(X t − ρ −1 t W ) with K ∈ R n . Then the cost functional can be expressed as J t (X t ; u t ) = (X t − ρ This completes the proof.
